⚪ net/ncsi: fix heap OOB read in NCSI_CMD_SEND_CMD payload length (Linux Linux)

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/ncsi: fix heap OOB read in NCSI_CMD_SEND_CMD payload length ncsi_send_cmd_nl() takes the number of bytes to copy from the attacker-controlled ncsi_pkt_hdr.length field of the in-band packet header, while the source buffer is the NCSI_ATTR_DATA netlink attribute whose readable size is nla_len() - sizeof(ncsi_pkt_hdr). The two length sources are never cross-checked: only nla_len() >= sizeof(struct ncsi_pkt_hdr) is enforced. With hdr->length set larger than the attribute payload (up to 65535 against at most 2032 readable bytes), ncsi_cmd_handler_oem() copies past the end of the netlink attribute buffer with unsafe_memcpy(), leaking up to ~64KB of kernel heap memory into the transmitted NCSI command packet. The destination skb is sized by the declared payload, so the write side does not overflow - this is a pure OOB read / information leak, reachable with CAP_NET_ADMIN on systems with a registered NCSI device (e.g. OpenBMC on Aspeed BMC SoCs, where NET_NCSI=y is standard). Reject commands whose declared payload extends past the end of the data attribute. The issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at Tencent Yunding Lab.