GHSA-v3pr-hxpr-mfm8

Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass

At a glance

Published
Updated
CVE
CVE-2026-47065
CVSS_V3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Description

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.

Affected packages

PackageVersions
Maven · org.apache.mina:mina-coreintroduced 2.2.0, fixed 2.2.8
Maven · org.apache.mina:mina-coreintroduced 2.1.0, fixed 2.1.13
Maven · org.apache.mina:mina-coreintroduced 0, fixed 2.0.29

References

Sources

SourceLicence
OSV.devCC-BY 4.0 — GitHub Advisory Database