GHSA-m452-q8c9-rg2f

Description

### Impact A **cookie tossing / cookie injection** issue (CWE-1275). `ThreadSafeCookieStore` stored a cookie under the value of its `Domain` attribute without verifying that the responding host is allowed to set a cookie for that domain (RFC 6265 §5.3 step 6). A host the client connects to can therefore plant a cookie scoped to an unrelated domain, and the client will then send that cookie on later requests to that domain. ### Who is Impacted Applications that use a single `AsyncHttpClient` instance - and thus the default, shared `CookieStore` - to reach **both** an attacker-influenced host and a trusted host. Typical exposure: crawlers, link-preview / webhook fetchers, SSRF-style "fetch this URL" features, multi-backend aggregators, or following redirects to an attacker-controlled host. The attacker can *write* a cookie the client presents to the victim host (session fixation, overwriting a session id / CSRF-token cookie); they cannot *read* the victim host's cookies. Applications that talk only to a fixed trusted backend, or that disable/scope the cookie store, are not exposed. ### Patches Fixed in 3.0.11 and 2.16.0 ### Workarounds - Disable the cookie store (setCookieStore(null)) when cookies are not needed; or - Use a separate AsyncHttpClient (separate cookie store) per trust domain so an attacker-influenced host and a trusted host never share a jar - Supply a custom CookieStore whose add(Uri, Cookie) rejects cookies whose Domain is not domain-matched by the request host.