GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh

symfony/ux-autocomplete: Information exposure via unescaped LIKE wildcards in EntitySearchUtil

At a glance

Published
Updated
CVE
CVE-2026-49211
CVSS_V4
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Description

### Description `Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard. Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security => false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose. ### Resolution `EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE '\'` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a30007769214) for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x). ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.

Affected packages

PackageVersions
Packagist · symfony/ux-autocompleteintroduced 2.2.0, fixed 2.36.0
Packagist · symfony/ux-autocompleteintroduced 3.0.0, fixed 3.1.0

References

Sources

SourceLicence
OSV.devCC-BY 4.0 — GitHub Advisory Database