GHSA-676x-f7gg-47vc

Netty Vulnerable to DNS Cache Poisoning via Missing Bailiwick Checks in CNAME Records

En bref

Publiée
Mise à jour
CVE
CVE-2026-45674
CVSS_V3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Description

### Summary Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses. ### Details In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext#buildAliasMap`, the resolver processes the ANSWER section of a DNS response and blindly caches all CNAME records it finds. According to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5452#section-6 ``` Care must be taken to only accept data if it is known that the originator is authoritative for the QNAME or a parent of the QNAME. One very simple way to achieve this is to only accept data if it is part of the domain for which the query was intended. ``` ### Impact DNS Cache Poisoning (Bailiwick Bypass). Any application using Netty's DNS resolver is impacted.

Paquets affectés

PaquetVersions
Maven · io.netty:netty-resolver-dnsintroduced 4.2.0.Final, fixed 4.2.15.Final
Maven · io.netty:netty-resolver-dnsintroduced 0, fixed 4.1.135.Final

Références

Sources

SourceLicence
OSV.devCC-BY 4.0 — GitHub Advisory Database