GHSA-5pvg-856g-cp85

Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records

At a glance

Published
Updated
CVE
CVE-2026-47691
CVSS_V3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Description

### Summary Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). ### Details In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. This means if the resolver queries evil.co.uk., it will accept an NS record claiming authority over co.uk.. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key (co.uk.). This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under co.uk.. The `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#cache` method only prevents caching if the record is for the root zone (dots == 1). ### Impact DNS Cache Poisoning. Any application using Netty's DNS resolver is impacted.

Affected packages

PackageVersions
Maven · io.netty:netty-resolver-dnsintroduced 4.2.0.Final, fixed 4.2.15.Final
Maven · io.netty:netty-resolver-dnsintroduced 0, fixed 4.1.135.Final

References

Sources

SourceLicence
OSV.devCC-BY 4.0 — GitHub Advisory Database